Professional Judgment in an Era of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning by Pasquale, Frank A.
1 
Professional Judgment in an Era of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning 
Frank Pasquale 
 
Though artificial intelligence (AI) in healthcare and education now accomplishes diverse tasks, 
there are two features that tend to unite the information processing behind efforts to substitute it 
for professionals in these fields: reductionism and functionalism. True believers in substitutive 
automation tend to model work in human services by reducing the professional role to a set of 
behaviors initiated by some stimulus, which are intended to accomplish some predetermined goal, 
or maximize some measure of well-being. However, true professional judgment hinges on a way 
of knowing the world that is at odds with the epistemology of substitutive automation. Instead of 
reductionism, an encompassing holism is a hallmark of professional practice—an ability to 
integrate facts and values, the demands of the particular case and prerogatives of society, and the 
delicate balance between mission and margin. Any presently plausible vision of substituting AI 
for education and health-care professionals would necessitate a corrosive reductionism. The only 
way these sectors can progress is to maintain, at their core, autonomous professionals capable of 
carefully intermediating between technology and the patients it would help treat, or the students it 






 Neoliberal ideology shapes both selves and society. The self is modeled as a maximizing 
or at least satisficing individual, seeking various forms of capital, power, and pleasure. Dominant 
evaluative modes are quantitative, algorithmic, and instrumentalist, focused on financialized 
rubrics of productivity (Beer, 2016). Society is a competition, primarily organized by markets, as 
designed and redesigned by state actors and, increasingly, by firms like Amazon and eBay (for 
their third-party sellers), TaskRabbit (for labor), Uber (for rides), and Google (for advertising) 
(Van Loo 2016). 
Professionals in two human services sectors—health care and education—have offered 
sustained and extensive (if often unsuccessful) resistance to this neoliberal ideology of substitutive 
automation. Each sector values certain practices, defining them as constitutive of the field, rather 
than as mere means to an end. Nonprofits have a powerful presence in each sector, balancing 
mission and margin. Good physical and mental health, and knowledge, are ends in themselves, not 
merely means to accomplish something else. Excellent medical and educational practice do not 
easily admit of quantitative measurement. Qualitative evaluation, and a humble willingness to 
recalibrate and risk-adjust quantitative data, is crucial.  
These professional ideals are all too often (and ironically) discounted in professional 
schools, especially business and law schools, and among the managers who stand to profit by 
commoditizing service industries (Khurana 2010, 2016)). Too many thought leaders in each depict 
automation as a veritable force of nature, driven forward by unstoppable currents of economic 
change. They advance rhetorics of automation, AI, and big data to devalue certain forms of labor 
by characterizing them either as routinizable, or in need of rationalization via machine learning 
3 
(Greenfield 2017). Many law firm partners and “legal tech” consultants deride legal research and 
writing as a task that computers can automate, in part to justify lower wages for current associates 
(Pasquale and Cashwell 2015). Non-professional workers have been modeled as a fungible source 
of data to be replaced by machines and software once a critical mass of their daily tasks is 
computerizable. Now, according to neoliberal devotees of disruption theory, it is time to bring that 
logic to the service sector. 
 Neoliberal managerialists promote AI as hard-headed common sense: the obvious next step 
to improve quality and cut costs. However, their views rest on a contestable epistemology of 
automation, grounded in the susceptibility of future situations to be translated into identifiable 
factors that machines can recognize and optimally respond to. This epistemology persistently 
ignores or elides the meaning of human practices, while focusing on their results. It hypostatizes 
the “data-driven,” while minimizing the all-too-human process of gathering, cleaning, and 
analyzing data. Each of these steps is simultaneously vital to the strong AI vision of automation 
and are occasions for the exercise of professional judgment if they are to be done at all well. Data 
gathering and evaluation are not some trivial routine to be quickly dispatched at the outset of 
automation. Rather, they are essential to the entire project of automation. 
Advocates of disruptive AI tend to presume that better technology (such as internet of 
things devices, or ubiquitous sensor networks) will simply accumulate the data necessary for 
quantum leaps in AI capacity. However, data about either processes or outcomes is rarely a simple 
“given,” automatically captured by sensors or even algorithmically “smart” cameras and 
microphones (Gitelman 2013; Kitchin 2104). Instead, it is contestable, as multiple data sources, 
interpretations, rankings, and ratings reveal in service sectors ranging from health to education. 
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A wide-ranging literature on algorithmic accountability, as well as an academic and 
corporate movement for fairness, accuracy, and transparency in machine learning (FATML), is 
now revealing the scope and depth of bias, inaccuracy, and opacity in data and algorithms 
commonly employed in AI. These are valuable and important contributions to academic and 
professional discourses. However, current enthusiasm for reforming and improving AI will not 
address the theoretical infirmities of a neoliberal managerialist project premised on replacing 
human services professionals with software and machines. Indeed, reformists may well share these 
methodological meta-biases.  
Though AI systems are growing more complex (Domingos 2015), reductionism and 
functionalism are two fundamental features of the information processing behind efforts to 
substitute AI and robotics for professionals. Reductionism extends Taylorist “scientific 
management” from manufacturing into professional contexts. Functionalism conceives of each 
part of a social order conducing to the operation of a larger system. Each is a poor fit for human 
service sectors, given the inevitably political, values-based, and conflictual nature of key aspects 
of good practice within them. 
Robotics and AI, including even advanced machine-learning systems, comprehend 
professions as jobs, jobs as tasks, and tasks as observation, information processing, and actuation. 
Though such strategies to divide labor are sensible in many industrial contexts, they ignore the 
irreducibly holistic assessments that are hallmarks of good judgment.  
Functionalism is another hallmark of automative epistemology. As a way of apprehending 
patients or students, functionalism moels their malaise or ignorance as an impediment to the proper 
functioning of society. For functionalists, the mind and body can be treated as “black boxes”—
there is no need to explain how a given pattern of exposure to lectures and reading resulted in, say, 
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a certain pattern of responses to multiple choice questions, or a certain average wage after 
graduation. The critical issue was simply figuring out what was the optimal pattern of stimulus to 
guarantee the right results in the future, to ensure proper functioning of one part (the student) in 
the whole (the labor market).  
Despite massive investments in it, substitutive automation has not had much success in 
health and education. Instead of reductionism, an encompassing holism is a hallmark of 
professional practice—an ability to integrate facts and values, the demands of the particular case 
and prerogatives of society, and the delicate balance between mission and margin. Functionalism 
fails on other grounds—it elides the inevitably political, contestable, and conflictual aspects of 
professional life. Functionalism is properly a theory of biological and ecological systems to the 
extent that all parts work together to maintain homeostasis in an organism, or a sustainable balance 
of predators and prey in a given environment. It is always an uneasy fit in human systems because 
there are plural human goals and values, and the satisfaction of some entails the frustration of 
others. A technocratic “solution” to the problem of education is imaginable if the school and 
university really is a mere handmaiden to the labor market, but once other aims of education (such 
as the civic, aesthetic, and cultural), there is no singular system for the educator to function within.  
Functionalism and reductionism combine to promote manipulative and normatively 
impoverished ways of modeling human interactions. Interpretive social science offers a much 
richer way of discussing the ways in which education and medicine can go well or poorly. A 
Habermasian model of communicative (as opposed to strategic) action recognizes the importance 
of intersubjective understanding and agreement in the classroom and the clinic (as the legal 
doctrine of “informed consent” suggests). Neither quality education nor quality medical care are 
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reducible to a series of predetermined (or even machine-learned) steps. Knowledge, skill, and 
ethics are inextricably intertwined (Pasquale 2015a). 
This essay exposes the suspect philosophical foundations of leading efforts to automate the 
health and education sectors. Just as few contemporary neoliberal thinkers would directly 
acknowledge the neoliberal foundations of their perspectives, AI mavens who would automate the 
professions rarely describe themselves as reductionists and functionalists (Mirowski 2014). 
Nevertheless, their methods directly reflect those commitments (Head 2014). Naming them 
unlocks decades of critiques, which ought to be available to those now seeking to resist blunt, 
substitutive automation in their professions. I summarize those counter narratives as holistic 
judgment and conflict theory. Both will stand as cornerstones of a humane professionalism that 
takes the diversity of human aims and aspirations seriously. 
. 
Disruption as Reductionism 
Few experts in AI predict the imminent replacement of professionals by computers. 
However, in the disruption theory so popular in both Silicon Valley and Wall Street, technology 
should largely replace, rather than help, existing workers—even in human services. The critical 
idea here is that software and robotics can do for the health and education sectors what it once did 
for manufacturing: drastically expand production and reduce employment while cutting costs. 
Leading business theorists push for robotically standardized work as a key to future 
advances in productivity in the health and education sectors. As business schools have abandoned 
the idea of management itself as a profession (Khurana 2010, 2016), their thought leaders look to 
alternative conceptualizations of managers’ roles. Some model the replacement of labor with 
machines as a straightforward task: record and simulate a worker’s pattern of actions, and then 
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develop algorithms for their mechanical replication. The decline of privacy and the rise of 
surveillance expands the scope of such Taylorist aspirations (Bogard 1996). 
For example, Harvard Business School professor Clayton Christensen sees Lasik-surgery 
machines as a model for future medical innovation, building expertise into equipment rather than 
relying on professionals for it (Christensen et al. 2009: 323–34). From this perspective, most 
doctors, most of the time, are not exercising judgment, like an artist or designer; instead, they are 
simply trying to match a set of symptoms to an optimal treatment modality (22–24). For disrupters, 
that problem is ideally suited to standardized, “value-adding processes,” like assembly-line work. 
Tomes like Disrupting Class and The Innovator’s Prescription lay out a blueprint for 
revolutionizing education and health care, respectively (Christensen et al. 2009; Christensen et al. 
2008). 
For two decades, Christensen has advanced a sweeping account of “disruption” as an 
explanation of business history and as the key to its future. According to disruption theory, nimble 
competitors replace established firms by developing rival products for the bottom end of the 
market. Initially cheap and of poor quality, these rival products end up dominating markets. 
Christensen’s theory of disruptive innovation has electrified the management consultant class, and 
its influence extends far beyond business. Thought leaders now aim to disrupt government as well 
(Eggers et al. 2013). Christensen has told both hospital and university leaders to shake up their 
operations (Kleinke 2009; Eyring and Christensen 2011). His public statements suggest that 
implementing disruptive principles can improve virtually every facet of human existence. Why, 
he asks, buy a single painting for your apartment when digital gallerists can email your flat screen 
“a fresh piece of art” (Lambert 2014) every three weeks? Disruption has become a theory of 
everything, catapulting Christensen to guru status as scholar, consultant, and sage. 
8 
Nevertheless, serious academics question the validity and relevance of disruption theory. 
Historian Jill Lepore’s devastating New Yorker profile portrayed Christensen as an academic 
lightweight who downplays evidence that large, stable companies can sustain their business 
models (Lepore 2014). Business researchers Andrew A. King and Baljir Baatartogtokh (2015) 
have strengthened Lepore’s case (Goldstein 2015). As Lee Vinsel (2015) observes, they found 
“only 9 of 77 cases that Christensen used as examples of disruptive innovation actually fit the 
criteria of his own theory.” Given these embarrassments, it may be time to consign “disruption” to 
the dustbin of stale management theory buzzwords. Yet it is difficult for mere academics to debunk 
theories of “disruptive innovation,” because they are less attempts to describe the world than 
blueprints for remaking it. 
For over a decade, business books have exhorted managers to be “supercrunchers”—
numbers-obsessed quantifiers, quick to make important decisions as “data driven” as possible. 
There is an almost evangelical quality to this work, a passionate belief that older, intuition-driven 
decisions are a sinful relic of a fallen world. In Machine Platform Crowd (2017), MIT professors 
Andrew McAfee and Erik Brynjolfsson aim to formalize the successive canonizations of statistics, 
big data, AI, and machine learning into a consultant-friendly catechism of what smart business 
leaders should do today. 
In earlier iterations of AI, researchers tried to reduce human expertise to a series of 
propositions, rules to be applied by an expert system. Although this approach can work well for 
very narrow applications, it is difficult to formalize human reactions and skills into a series of 
rules. Contemporary approaches to machine learning attempt to overcome that problem by rapidly 
iterating potential responses to problems and evaluating the success (or likelihood of success) of 
each.1 With enough data and computing power, machine-learning experts can try multiple 
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algorithms to optimize performance. McAfee and Brynjolfsson mention the difficult problem of 
managing the temperature of a server farm, and it is easy to see how a computer program could 
solve the problem second-by-second better than any human expert, because there are so many 
variables (airflow, temperature outside, computational intensity in various parts of the building, 
etc.) that need to be computed nearly instantaneously. Moreover, a cutting-edge system can 
experiment, shifting allocations of cooling effort among, say, fans, air conditioners, and other 
methods, or determining whether a relocation of computing activity (toward, say, colder walls in 
winter) might be more cost-effective than increasing airflow in areas prone to overheating. 
Various machine-learning methods are now being developed by different schools of 
computer scientists. Basic pattern recognizers can map a classic response to a given situation. 
Evolutionary algorithms can spawn a large number of approaches to a problem, experiment with 
which works best, and deploy the best method in the future. Bayesian classifiers can weigh 
evidence about whether a given strategy is working or not, modeling causation along arcs 
connecting different nodes in a network. And some programs even compose approaches on the fly, 
coming up with the types of nonhuman intelligence that wowed informed commentators during 
the victory of AlphaGo, Google’s Go-playing AI program, against the reigning Go champion in 
2016. 
McAfee and Brynjolfsson contrast what they describe as machines’ implacable, objective 
data analysis with humans’ tendency to distraction and subjective judgments. But their case for 
machine learning is overstated—even self-contradictory. To suggest that software can be 
optimized to make better decisions than humans, they offer a series of examples to demonstrate 
weaknesses in human judgment. A sociology professor used a mathematical model to predict 
firms’ adherence to budget and timeliness of product delivery better than purchasing managers. A 
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county’s nonverbal IQ test included more minority children in a gifted program than a process 
centered around parent and teacher nominations. Law professors’ simple, six-variable model 
predicted Supreme Court rulings for the 2002 term better than eighty-three prominent legal experts 
did. From examples like these, and a simple behavioral economics story about human 
susceptibility to instinctual rashness, McAfee and Brynjolfsson conclude, “The evidence is 
overwhelming that, whenever the option is available, relying on data and algorithms alone usually 
leads to better decisions and forecasts than relying on the judgment of even experienced and 
‘expert’ humans.”2 
But where do the algorithms and data come from? Experienced and expert humans. As 
digital sociologist Karen Gregory has observed, big data is made of people (Gregory, 2014). In 
most work settings, persons develop the algorithms to parse data generated by persons. People are 
part of the “crowd” that McAfee and Brynjolfsson (following Clay Shirky’s Here Comes 
Everybody) praise for supplying data and labor to so many machine-learning applications, ranging 
from spam detection to targeted ads. Sophisticated work in critical algorithm studies repeatedly 
emphasizes the intertwining of computational and human elements in decision-making. 
Thought leaders like Christensen, McAfee, and Brynjolfsson are too prone to elevate the 
computational aspects of business practices and to devalue their precursors and context. 
Computational thinking “is the thought processes involved in formulating problems so their 
solutions can be represented as computational steps and algorithms” (Aho 2011). In a brief, oft-
cited article, Jeannette Wing has characterized computational thinking as “using abstraction and 
decomposition when attacking a large complex task or designing a large complex system” (among 
many other things—her article offers a litany of the particular tasks that exemplify the “steps and 
algorithms” Aho describes) (Wing 2006). This decomposition of practice into smaller and smaller 
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parts is also a hallmark of the division of labor in general and its Taylorist application to 
professions in more recent literature on automation. 
There is little doubt that computational approaches can help inform both health 
professionals and teachers as they do their work. Data about drug-drug interactions can inform 
clinical decision support systems, for example—or information about particularly effective lessons 
may build up as schools engage in more data collection. Nevertheless, the computational approach 
cannot substitute for professional judgment in myriad situations, which themselves cannot be 
identified by an algorithm in advance. For example, while early courses for mental health 
professionals may describe a series of routinized steps to begin a psychotherapeutic encounter, 
mental health care is not like a chess game, where every conceivable series of moves and 
countermoves are ideally mapped out in advance by authoritative teachers, administrators, or 
managers, let alone computer programs or algorithms (Weizenbaum 1976). 
Nor does the ostensibly more mysterious AI behind Google’s recent victory with its 
AlphaGo program portend well here. Set aside, for a moment, the usual debates over the 
inexplicability of machine learning—usually marshaled by AI proponents to demonstrate that it is 
or will be as flexible and spontaneous as human minds and thus worthy of similar respect and 
consideration (Gunkel 2014). Algorithmic thinking is fundamentally an optimization problem—a 
way of achieving a given end state or condition (O’Neil 2016; Eubanks 2017; Pasquale 2015b). Is 
there general agreement on what the indicia of a “cure” are in a psychotherapeutic encounter? Or 
whether orthopedic patients should “learn to live with” a slight ache, try a drug, or perform physical 
therapy (Reid 2010)? Each of these conditions, and countless more, are complex problems 
informed by multiple factors, whose identification itself will often justifiably vary among 
providers, insurers, and health system administrators. 
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There has long been a movement in US health care for “evidence-based medicine,” which 
seeks to reduce variation in the treatment of certain conditions in order to promote optimal care 
(Wennberg et al. 2007). US doctors routinely engage in unnecessary procedures (Charlesworth et 
al. 2016), and there is some evidence that automated clinical decision support software and other 
interventions could help nudge them away from such decisions (Tilson et al. 2016). Nevertheless, 
just as guardrails on a highway do not (yet) justify driverless cars, so too is the ability of automated 
clinical decision support to identify and warn against potentially unnecessary care merely 
necessary, but not sufficient, to a project of widespread automation of clinical practice. 
The fate of clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) should serve as a cautionary tale for 
medicine’s computationalist reductionists. In the 1960s, physician groups began developing 
guidelines for the treatment of common conditions, like arrhythmia or migraine headaches. Such 
CPGs soon multiplied, covering many more conditions. Varying CPGs developed among different 
sets of practitioners; for example, there are at least five CPGs for treatment of congestive heart 
failure. Litigants started to use CPGs as evidence in some malpractice cases—to prove, for 
example, that a doctor had failed to meet the standard of care. 
Soon, even more CPGs developed. Doctors who usually worked for the malpractice 
defense bar began to develop CPGs that were capacious—that is, they characterized a very wide 
range of practice as acceptable in response to a given condition (Mehlman 2012). Those who 
usually worked for plaintiffs did the opposite and tried to establish stricter standards (Furrow 
2011). Those patterns may seem like a mere distortion of the medical system by warped 
malpractice law. However, even if malpractice causes of action were abolished, good faith 
disagreements over the scope and applicability of the guidelines would remain. As Ludwig 
Wittgenstein observed, only the simplest rules can articulate within themselves all the 
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circumstances of their application (Schauer 1990). The rise of shared decision-making guides for 
conditions ranging from cancer to back pain demonstrates the importance of patient input into the 
caregiving process. Even if physicians of the future can deploy a combination of learning health-
care system data and precision medicine to develop optimal treatment plans according to accepted 
rubrics in many cases, there will always be preference-sensitive care scenarios where deliberation 
on the values of the patient, with the patient, is critical. Moreover, it is very difficult to identify 
such scenarios in advance, so extracting the physician from “routine” care encounters would 
sacrifice critical opportunities for identifying these more complex, and value-laden, episodes of 
diagnosis, treatment, and support. 
Bad-faith distortions of CPGs are also quite easy to imagine. Pharmaceutical firms may 
develop CPGs elevating the importance of their own blockbuster drugs (or, more likely, fund 
patients’ rights groups to do so) (Choudhry 2002). Insurance companies, wary of expensive 
interventions, may make “watchful waiting” a more salient option (Woolf 1998). A 
computationalist might hope that all these groups would come together with doctors, economists, 
and other experts to hammer out one great and comprehensive CPG for each condition, as the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has come to consensus on solving so many problems in 
online connectivity (Froomkin 2003). The IETF, however, decided about problems for which we 
have well-known parameters for service quality. At present, we do not have any principled 
governance procedure for setting the metrics for any number of medical conditions—or for 
establishing a rule of recognition that would allow a robot to recognize when a condition entered 
the realm of conditions with “well-defined metrics of success,” as opposed to far more difficult 
scenarios. 
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Consider, say, a Stage IV congestive heart failure patient with an aortic valve issue who 
can either choose open heart surgery with a 10 percent chance of living eleven more months or a 
likely death within three months. That is clearly a computationally intractable scenario—whatever 
is to be decided must be talked over by the patient, doctors, the patient’s family, and perhaps others 
(such as counselors, ministers or rabbis, and an insurer). When does the decision become 
“obvious”? When it is a 5 percent chance of living nine months? A 2 percent chance of living five 
months? I would never choose the surgery at that point; however, other patients may have other 
priorities or values. 
This example may seem cherry-picked or overstated. However, dilemmas are legion. 
Kenneth Kaitin, director of the Tufts Center for Drug Development, describes “a cancer drug that 
only extends life by three months but allows you to go home, versus one that extends it a year but 
you end up staying in the hospital for the year, versus one that delays the progression of the disease 
but your overall outcome is not any different” (Swetlitz 2017). “There’s so much gray area,” he 
rightly concludes, implicating exactly the kinds of conflicts of values and introspection that 
algorithms are ill suited to address. 
There are also parallels to it at every level of severity of conditions. Those suffering from 
a sinus infection should weigh the relative balance of risk and benefits of taking an antibiotic. 
Medical practices of risk reduction also present recurrent need for holistic assessments of a 
patient’s health, including hard judgments about what is relevant to the holistic assessment. Even 
a practice as innocuous as taking one 81 mg aspirin a day (to ward off heart attacks) has some 
potential side effects (such as stomach bleeding). A reductionist may solve the trade-off by 
assigning a cardiac risk score to patients and recommending the prophylactic aspirin ingestion only 
to those with a certain level of risk. However, should a doctor also consider the possibility of stroke 
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prevention via aspirin in this scenario? How many other articles in the medical literature on daily 
aspirin ingestion should enter the doctor’s consideration—or any overall risk score on aspirin use? 
If there are multiple risk scores, how does one choose the appropriate one to consult? Again, these 
are very difficult decisions that depend, in part, on one’s degree of confidence in the validity of 
the studies—a question by no means straightforward to answer in our contemporary age of “bent 
science” and “bad pharma” (McGarity and Wagner 2008; Mirowski 2011. 
In short, Peter Denning is correct to question the universality of computational thinking: 
 
Alan Perlis . . . claimed that everyone can benefit from learning computational 
thinking. Other luminaries have followed suit. However, this general claim has 
never been substantiated with empirical research. 
For example, it is reasonable to question whether computational thinking is 
of immediate use for professionals who do not design computations—for example, 
physicians, surgeons, psychologists, architects, artists, lawyers, ethicists, realtors, 
and more. Some of these professionals may become computational designers when 
they modify tools, for example by adding scripts to document searchers—but not 
everybody. It would be useful to see some studies of how essential computational 
thinking is in those professions. (Denning 2017) 
 
Denning correctly calls for more empirical research—but even better would be an 
acknowledgment that medicine, law, education, and other fields are independent spheres of 
judgment whose experts would understandably seek support from AI applications but would not 
be replaced by them (Styhre 2013). As Will Davies has argued, “A profession that claimed 
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jurisdiction over everything would no longer be a profession but a form of epistemological 
tyranny” (Davies 2017). When computer scientist Pedro Domingos openly quests for a “Master 
Algorithm” that “can derive all knowledge in the world—past, present, and future—from data,” 
he is pursuing precisely that form of “epistemological tyranny” (Domingos 2015). Such an 
approach reduces individuals to “dividuals,” mere data points to be processed by machines 
(Sadowski and Pasquale 2015). 
 
The Power of Reductionist Metrics 
Contrasted with algorithmic imperialism, a diversity of professions appears to be a far more 
democratic and distributed way of recognizing and cultivating expertise. However, the 
professional bargain—workers granted autonomy, in exchange for advanced education, a 
continued commitment to keep up with the cutting edge of their fields, and fiduciary duties to the 
clients they work for—has been under attack for decades. Both left- and right-wing critics have 
impugned the motives of licensing boards that have controlled access to certain types of jobs 
(Larson 1977; MacDonald 1995; Abbott 1988). For the Right, professional autonomy with respect 
to some aspects of one’s work offends the market principle that the purchaser of the service has 
the authority to define it (Gellhorn 1976). Left-wing critics have suggested a potentially 
conspiratorial elite: “If the possessors of [specialized] knowledge can form themselves into a 
group, which can then begin to standardize and control the dissemination of the knowledge base 
and dominate the market in knowledge based services, they will then be in a position to enter into 
a regulatory bargain with the state. This will allow them to standardize and restrict access to their 
knowledge, to control their market and supervise the production of producers” (Larson 1977: 71).3 
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Skepticism of the health and education sectors also created an opening for alternative modes of 
organizing work—or assessing its value—to gain traction. 
For computationalist proponents of automation, metrics are a polestar of accountability, 
appealing to diverse ideological formations. To conservatives, outstanding performance on a well-
recognized metric offers a kind of currency to a professional to compensate for market 
imperfections. For example, while most doctors do not charge what individuals can bear for what 
they do but instead must negotiate for payments with third-party payers, they cannot capture the 
full market value of exceptional performance. Ranking as the best spine surgeon or endocrinologist 
not only confers prestige, it can also enable the highly ranked professional to attract a large 
clientele or to charge high fees to cash-only patients (Pasquale 2007b). Where such rich rewards 
are unavailable, payors (ranging from government to private insurers to patients themselves) may 
simply avoid low-ranked doctors. School districts have demoted, reduced the pay of, or even fired 
teachers who perform poorly according to an algorithmic scoring of their performance—or, more 
accurately, the performance of their students on certain standardized tests. 
For some progressives, metric discipline of professionals appeals as a way of controlling 
the discretion of groups perceived to be powerful elites. It is easy to see why leftists might be 
suspicious of, say, gastroenterologists earning $500,000 a year and demand that they demonstrate 
objective measures of performance, beyond hours worked or cases seen. Metrics also animated a 
core part of the compensation of Accountable Care Organizations’ (ACOs) under the Medicare 
Shared Savings Program in the Affordable Care Act (ACA). This complex regulatory mechanism 
set forth thirty-three quality measurements for ACOs; they could share in the cost savings they 
generated only if they maintained or improved their scores on these metrics (Pasquale 2012). The 
Medicaid Authorization and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA) set forth even more 
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complex mechanisms for Advance Payment Models (APMs), including ACOs, and yet another 
program for physicians who have not joined APMs. 
Neoliberal dominance of the Democratic Party has also tempted its education policy 
leaders to impose more metrics on teachers, despite recurrent critiques of their reliability (O’Neil 
2016) and effect on minority communities (Glynn and Waldeck 2013). Schoolteachers may not 
seem like much of an elite, as they earn less than similarly educated persons. Nevertheless, in a 
country where only about 33 percent of adults have a college degree, their pay is often above the 
median income, making them a target for the discipline of metrics. 
The most effective way to storm the citadel of professional power is to question the 
distinction between expert and amateur. Critics of professions tend to see licensing as a hopelessly 
crude and unfair way of dividing the labor force into those capable of, say, practicing medicine or 
teaching, and those not qualified to do so. Metrics derived from big data are one way of dissolving 
the binary into a spectrum, from the most to the best qualified for any position. 
To underpin this spectrum of assessment, big data and other forms of popular assessment 
could empower consumers to make their own judgments as to price/quality trade-offs instead of 
relying on professional boards. Teacher and doctor ratings, for example, could displace extant 
licensing and certification in those professions (Pasquale 2010b). According to the usual economic 
logic, such tiered rating (rather than all-or-nothing licensure) of professionals would expand 
access, gifting the poor the chance to pay far less for, say, health or education, by freely choosing 
lower-rated, cheap workers (including complete novices) in both fields. If the cheapest provider is 
a robot, virtual charter school, or app, all the better, from this perspective. 
It is, however, often easy for the cynical or hypercompetitive to game rating and ranking 
systems (Pasquale 2011). Firms with substantial marketing budgets can invest in search engine 
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optimization, review manipulation, and “astroturfed” recommendations (i.e., fake grassroots) 
(Reagle 2014). Money invested in influencing an intermediary’s ranking may be more important 
than actual performance; that is one reason why so many for-profits spend more on marketing than 
on instruction (Collini 2013). Corporations or foundations may pay think tanks to smear 
competitors with biased and one-sided reports. Competition can also reshape the very values it 
advances, by encoding (and, all too often, distorting) them in crude metrics (Pasquale 2007a). 
Of course, we all dream of someday receiving proper recognition for our work, and 
sometimes this dream takes the form of hoping or demanding a ranking of its value. Managers 
recognize that they can take advantage of this altogether justifiable longing for recognition and 
direct it to their own purposes. The commensurating power of numbers, sweeping aside contestable 
narratives, promises a simple rank ordering of merit, whether in schools, hospitals, or beyond. 
Measurements are not simply imposed from the top down (Espeland and Sauder 2016).4 They also 
colonize our own understandings of merit—and at the limit can count on self-interestedly rational 
support from the 49.9 percent of persons who are going to end up “above-average” on any 
percentile metric. 
Those who do well on metrics should be very careful about promoting such measures, 
because they so often distort the social practice that they ostensibly measure (Edwards and Roy 
2017). Measured on their thirty-day mortality rate (i.e., the percentage of patients who are still 
living thirty days after an operation), surgeons may simply avoid taking care of the very sick 
(Knapton 2016).5 Cheating scandals have rocked schools ranked and rated on test scores. Even 
when the schools play fair, they may drop physical education, art, music, and other classes in order 
to teach to tests dominated by quantitative and verbal measures. As sociologist Donald T. 
Campbell put it in the eponymous Campbell’s Law, “The more any quantitative social indicator is 
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used for social decision-making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more 
apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor” (1975: 35). 
Of course, debunkers of metrics should practice their exposure of gaming with discretion 
and humility. As organizers of a conference on gamed metrics at the University of California, 
Davis asked, “Can we reliably draw a clear separation between gaming the metrics game and 
engaging in misconduct?” (Innovating Communication in Scholarship 2015). Even if such 
distinctions are hard to make, pursuing them is a worthy task wherever metrics have a serious 
impact on resource allocation. They help expose the manipulability of supposedly objective 
measures of success. 
Perhaps to avoid such manipulation, or to hide it, some institutions are now contracting 
with firms that boast of proprietary, secret algorithms designed to rank and rate employees. Rated 
individuals have a more difficult time gaming a metric when they cannot fully understand how it 
works (Pasquale 2011). Such measures tend to alienate knowledge workers. For example, the 
Rutgers Graduate Faculty voted to condemn such algorithmic ranking and rating by a 114–2 vote, 
rejecting out of hand black box and proprietary metrics (Flaherty 2016; Rutgers Graduate School 
Faculty 2016). They also demanded their data profiles. This was an important action based on 
documented concerns about the negative effects of black box algorithms in other sectors. As the 
activist mathematician Cathy O’Neil (2016) shows in her book Weapons of Math Destruction, 
algorithmic assessments of quality have unfairly denied critical opportunities for employment, 
career advancement, health, credit, and education. They deserve far more scrutiny than is common 
presently (Muller, 2018). 
There is also a fair amount of hypocrisy in the deployment of such measures. Managers 
now use algorithmic assessment tools to sort employees worldwide on criteria of cost-effectiveness 
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but spare themselves the same invasive surveillance and ranking (Peck 2013; Ashbrook 2013). 
Professionals in health and education should demand that administrators impose upon themselves 
similar reportable metrics of productivity—and rank themselves just as pervasively as they rank 
subordinates. 
Even flagship journals of the technocratic policy apparatus have acknowledged rankings’ 
fallibility. For example, an article in Health Affairs recently demonstrated that hospital rankings 
vary wildly, based on metrics like risk adjustment (e.g., how much an at-risk patient population 
should excuse poor outcome measures from a doctor or hospital) (Austin et al. 2015). There are 
always new “risks” (and “benefits”) being discovered as influencers of health outcomes. Consider 
the controversy over the “epidemiological paradox” of the higher-than-expected health status of 
Latinos in the southwestern United States: despite worse secondary indicators of health (like blood 
pressure or obesity rates), this population appeared to live longer than many other groups with 
better numerical indicators of health (Markides and Coreil 1986).6 A simple application of that 
fact to metrics of hospital performance would require us to “risk adjust” for ethnicity—that is, to 
carefully avoid giving too much credit to hospitals with a highly Latino patient base because their 
results are being boosted by that demographic mix. However, there are many explanations for the 
Latino Paradox, each of which prevails to varying degrees among the demographic mix at any 
given hospital. Do risk adjusters dive in to that granular of an assessment of patient mix? When 
do they stop the chain of risk adjustment (say, boosting the score of a hospital that takes on more 
patients with high blood pressure than with other conditions) and adjustments to risk adjustments 
(knocking the score back down a bit when it turns out the hospital has a high proportion of Latino 
patients)? 
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These are deeply political and philosophical—not just technological—questions. The 
authors of the Health Affairs study mentioned above concluded that hospital rankings should be 
fine-tuned to be ever-better indicators of the true quality of services provided. But what if a bad 
ranking decreases a hospital’s number of privately insured patients (the most lucrative payers), 
reducing its resources, which in turn reduces its ability to do better in future rankings? A musical 
chairs logic of elimination could make sense for consumer goods that are discretionary purchases. 
When, however, it leads to the closure or weakening of “failing” hospitals and schools 
concentrated in poorer areas (a designation that can easily become a self-fulfilling prophecy), those 
left behind often must struggle to reassemble routine care. 
In mental health care, the question of “outcome measurement” is usually more fraught. Just 
as there is an ideological battle over the proper scope or intensity of use of “cognition-enhancing” 
drugs, there is inevitably social disagreement over which aspects of life are necessary or sufficient 
to happiness, or even the alleviation of misery (Pasquale 2010a; Crary 2013). Introspection is not 
susceptible to multiple choice or true/false questions, however eagerly many “wellness vendors” 
may ask insured individuals to rate their marriage, job, community, and more, on a scale of 1 to 
10 (ranging from “not at all satisfied” to “very satisfied”) (Hull and Pasquale 2017). The extent 
and nature of obligations to family and community are contestable, and even if some practices of 
the self might improve well-being, it is not at all clear that an antiseptic form, often little more than 
a computerized confessional, is the proper place to prompt them or measure their impact. As David 
Morgan has observed, “Nothing human can be understood in the abstract. We also have to interpret 
thoughts, emotions, and behaviours in a social context” (Morgan 2016). 
 
Three Kinds of Functionalism 
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Fundamentally definitional issues lie at the heart of the movement to automate 
professions—for example, whether a series of online sessions, tests, and “badges” count as a 
college degree, or a series of texts can count as a psychotherapeutic encounter. Metrics-focused 
reductionism feeds into functionalist frames here. Can the well-badged student get a job? Is app 
therapy helping users get out of a funk and back to productive employment? These approaches 
assume that there is a clear and simple function for education and health interventions, and that 
once an AI replacement for a human instructor or health-care provider performs that function, the 
human is effectively replaceable. 
The term functionalism has many valences that are instructive here. For example, much of 
AI itself rests on a functionalist theory of mind—an idea that, “in principle, a machine (say, one 
of Isaac Asimov’s robots), a human being, a creature with a silicon chemistry, and a disembodied 
spirit could all work much the same way when described at the relevant level of abstraction, and 
that it is just wrong to think that the essence of our minds is our ‘hardware’” (Putnam 1988: xii). 
Philosopher Jerry Fodor has flatly stated that “thinking is computation” (Fodor 1998: 9).7 To the 
extent the former activity is exhausted by the latter, each advance in computing technology is a 
step toward the replacement of brain-based “wetware” with in silico processing capacities. On this 
view, the articulation of the functions of any social role should generate a finite list of tasks (and 
algorithms for choosing which tasks to perform, when, in response to a finite list of stimuli). Rather 
than viewing human embodiment as constitutive of the social role of doctor or teacher, the 
functionalist sees the human as just one of many possible entities to perform such tasks. 
Functionalism has also inspired a great deal of social science research. In both 
anthropology and sociology, functionalists have modeled social relations via an “organic analogy,” 
which “compared the different parts of a society to the organs of a living organism” (Porth et al. 
24 
n.d.).8 While the function of the stomach may be to digest, and the foot to aid in locomotion, the 
function of the education system may be modeled as preparation of workers for jobs, and the 
health-care system as keeping them healthy enough to perform productive labor (whether paid or 
unpaid). Of course, given what we now know about the many roles of gut bacteria in varied areas 
of health, the organic analogy appears crude from the start. Still, it is not in principle impossible 
to imagine various technologies taking over some roles in the body (such as a robotic pancreas), 
and similarly, the functionalist vision enables a way of comprehending society that is ultimately 
flexible and procedural, assuming a radical flexibility in the nature of institutions so long as they 
fulfill their necessary functions. 
Finally, in US administrative and constitutional law, functionalism is a legal theory 
recommending flexibility in our treatment of the expanding power of various agencies of 
government. The US Constitution assigns judicial functions to a judiciary, legislative functions to 
Congress, and executive functions to the president and the thousands of agencies and subsidiary 
entities he or she leads. As agencies interpret and apply vague statutes, they issue rules (a quasi-
legislative function) and adjudicate cases (a quasi-judicial function). Formalists have battled these 
manifestations of agency authority for decades, complaining that they grant outsized authority to 
the executive branch. Functionalists respond that there is simply no way of governing a nation as 
populous and diverse as the United States without delegating substantial power to agencies. Article 
III federal courts have tended to agree, realizing they have nowhere near the personnel necessary 
to replace, say, the hundreds of administrative law judges appointed pursuant to Article I to handle 
disability claims (let alone the thousands of other contexts where federal law is clarified and 
applied). 
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These three forms of functionalism—in philosophy, social science, and law—may appear, 
at first glance, to have little in common. Charles Taylor has cautioned that high-level models of 
self or society—whether reductionist or holistic—do not necessarily dictate any particular 
ideological or political position (Taylor 1989). However, there are elective affinities between the 
denigration of embodied humanness, the expansion of executive power, and the 
commercial/political pressure to reduce the power of professionals. As David Golumbia has 
explained in his genealogy of philosophical functionalism, computationalism joins biological 
reductionism in “the political philosophy we might call objectivism—the belief in a quasi-platonic 
‘world out there’ that transcends the human social world” (2009: 78). In most automative, 
substitutive visions of replacing human professionals with some combination of apps, software, 
and robots, there is a facile assumption that some authority could tote up the quantitative metrics 
of success in a field and decree when a machine had met or excelled human performance in these 
metrics. Quantitative technocracy in the executive branch—such as the “regleprudence” of the 
Office of Management and Budget—is a far better fit for such a vision than the agonistic haggling 
of rival interests in the legislative branch (Davidson and Leib 2015). 
Political deliberation, rhetoric, and logrolling in Congress recall one recurrent “other” of 
functionalist social theory—conflict theory. From Marxists (who emphasize class conflict) to 
pluralists (focused on rival interest groups), conflict theorists question the plausibility of models 
of social order operating harmoniously, like organs in a body. They emphasize the rivalrous, zero-
sum nature of allocation of resources within political and organizational settings. To be sure, this 
realistic, perhaps even naturalistic, view does not exhaust political theory—currents of more 
idealistic deliberativism and social democracy animate much vital thinking about democracy. 
However, conflict theory does give us a sense of the inevitably contested nature of topics ranging 
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from quotidian quality metrics and to the highest aspirations of medical and educational 
institutions. 
Nor are quantitative metrics the only rational way to resolve such conflicts. Organizations 
are inevitably political, and both rhetoric and persuasion justly play an important role in political 
life (Garsten 2006). It may be possible to lock students in a room with a sophisticated computer 
program each day and not let them out until they have mastered some set of interactions with the 
machine. Even if such a method achieved better test outcomes than traditional lectures and 
exercises, it should not be preferred to them. Rather than relying on force, or even its softer 
relations of incentives and intangible penalties, good teachers inspire, cajole, delight, and 
encourage (Bain 2004). In this practice, they model, for their charges, the kind of discussion, 
deliberation, and leadership that can make them effective citizens and workers. 
The value of dialogue in psychotherapeutic encounters, as well as in educational settings, 
should also be evident. There is wisdom in investing in human-focused care and education teams, 
rather than dispatching these duties to smartphones and apps. Students and patients should resist 
pervasive appification because it is a short step to behaviorism. For example, it is easy to imagine 
a future health app synced with a Pavlok wristband to shock diabetics who fail to take insulin at a 
certain time, after a series of warnings. Similarly, education technology prompting students to 
respond in stereotyped ways that are mechanically recognizable as adequate, menaces 
opportunities for creativity. This method of forcing behavior modification reflects an outsourcing 
of agency to machines. However effective it might be, it represents a disturbing externalization of 
the will—an analogue, at the personal level, to the type of decision a polity might make to install 
an authoritarian leader (Elster 1979). 
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Routes to Autonomy in an Era of Data-Driven Performance Metrics 
None of these points are meant to dismiss performance metrics or rankings altogether. 
Instead, policymakers should assure lasting and meaningful involvement of professionals in the 
processes meant authoritatively to judge their value. Co-governance of innovation, among extant 
professionals and technologists, is key. 
Ideally, professionals play some role in helping to construct the ranking systems that are 
measuring their performance, with an eye to improving their work. In the mid-2000s, doctors in 
New York and Connecticut found that insurers were rating them based on obscure metrics of “cost-
effectiveness” that often boiled down to how profitable their practice was for the insurer. Both 
sued, winning settlements that imposed a wide array of conditions on such rankings and ratings—
including transparency as to their calculation and the ability to contest scores and data (Madison 
2009). The suits rested on consumer protection rationales. Academics afflicted with similarly 
problematic rankings and ratings may want to study the ways doctors successfully contested such 
rankings.9 
We should also promote a positive vision of professional autonomy based on narrative 
assessments. It is not enough for us to express dissatisfaction with the metricization of 
accomplishment. As citation counts proliferate, accumulating the ersatz currency of reputational 
quantifications threatens to overwhelm the real purpose of research—just as financialization has 
all too often undermined the productive functions of the economy. Traditional modes of 
assessment (including tenure letters and Festschrift tributes) are an alternative form of evaluation. 
Essays explaining the shape of one’s career, and one’s reasons for choosing a certain topic or 
method of research, are a type of self-evaluation that should become more popular among scholars 
at certain career milestones (like tenure, appointment to full professor or senior lecturer, and, say, 
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every five or ten years thenceforward.) We need better, more narrative, midcareer assessments of 
the depth and breadth of scholarly contributions. Such qualitative modes of evaluation can be far 
richer than the quantification-driven metrics now ascendant in the academy. 
In short, it “takes a theory to beat a theory,” and an alternative method of explaining what 
we do and how we can do it in better or worse ways is necessary to displace the hegemony of 
rankings. Such narratives may impose their own disciplines and anxieties. At least they promise 
to relieve us from the fantasy that managers and bureaucrats can judge scholars, doctors, nurses, 
teachers, and workers of all kinds along preset, commensurating metrics. 
There is another, parallel reason to insist on a subordination of automation and 
standardization in classrooms and hospitals to the supervision of local domain experts—those 
primarily trained in healthcare and education, and only secondarily, if at all, in coding and software 
development. The relative autonomy of doctors and teachers reflects a hard-earned trust and a 
responsibility for governance. To the extent that persons, rather than distant algorithmic assessors, 
are running and staffing institutions, there is always some residue of autonomy and power 
entrusted to them locally. The kind and degree of that autonomy will always be as much a political 
as an economic question. 
Of course, this distribution of power, enabling certain workers to enjoy some level of 
autonomy and control over how they do their work, is always fragile and contestable. Sometimes 
professionals abuse the public trust, and their self-regulation needs to be monitored and regulated 
by the state. Nor should such respect and autonomy be reserved for professionals alone. 
Well-ordered societies may decide to slow down the pace of automation in almost any field, in 
order to assure more democratic governance of its implementation. The social theorist Hartmut 
Rosa has been dismissive of calls to “shape human affairs against the self-autonomizing forces of 
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acceleration” because he says “it remains unclear who the political and institutional bearers of such 
a politics of deceleration could be, and also because of the unpredictable economic and social costs 
that such a forced resynchronization would engender” (Rosa 2013: 321). However, both 
professions and unions have served, and can continue to serve, as these “political and institutional 
bearers of such a politics of deceleration.”10 Contemporary social theory must engage with existing 
regulatory bureaucracy and civil society institutions, rather than rejecting them out of hand with 
vague concerns about “unpredictable economic and social costs.” 
Nor is all-pervasive quantification and metricization the ineluctable logic of economic 
progress. For true believers in metrics and standardization, problems with existing metrics are 
simply a prompt to improve metrics. However, no advocate for civically focused education should 
feel obliged to articulate quantifiable measures of schools’ ability to preserve and maintain 
knowledge and culture, adapt to economic change, and prepare citizens for self-governance (Allen 
2016). Moreover, even if schools were to take on that well-nigh Sisyphean task of quantification, 
they could not specify outcome measures or key performance indicators in detail without attending 
to community input and values. These values are bound to evolve over time, as well. 
Any presently plausible vision of substituting AI for education and health-care 
professionals would necessitate a corrosive reductionism, premised on patients and students 
accepting services as “medical care” or “education” that are far inferior to what a skilled, reflective 
practitioner in either field could provide. The only way these sectors can progress is to maintain, 
at their core, a large (and likely growing) set of professionals capable of carefully intermediating 
between technology and the patients it would help treat, or the students it would help learn. The 





1. As Erik Brynjolfsson puts it, “If you give them enough examples the machine-learning 
algorithms figure out the rules on their own. That’s a real breakthrough. It overcomes what we call 
Polanyi’s paradox. Michael Polanyi the Polymath and philosopher from the 1960s famously said 
‘We all know more than we can tell,’ but with machine learning we don’t have to be able to tell or 
explain what to do. We just have to show examples. That change is what’s opening up so many 
new applications for machines and allowing it to do a whole set of things that previously only 
humans could do” (Brynjolfsson 2017). The suppressed question here, of course, is who decides 
which examples to show. That initial step is full of decisions saturated with politics and values, 
which are all too often laundered out of machine learning’s immaculate predictions. 
2. Ironically, the parade of examples the authors give for the superiority of “data-driven” decision-
making are themselves no more than a narrative of computationalist supremacy. McAfee and 
Brynjolfsson give us no sense of the universe of studies available on the comparative advantage 
of computation over human decision-making, the applicability of these studies, or even whether 
their examples have been replicated or reanalyzed. Without grounding in such basic statistical 
concepts, their sweeping claims (one study on Supreme Court prediction is a clue to the future of 
the entire legal industry; one logistics model could eliminate vast swathes of human labor in that 
field) will ring hollow to anyone with even the slightest critical faculty. 
3. For a response to Larson’s approach, see Remus 2015. 
4. Michael Sauder and Wendy Nelson Espeland (2009) discuss how administrators are tempted to 
“game the system” by focusing resources on certain metrics. They “define gaming as cynical 
efforts to manipulate the rankings data without addressing the underlying condition that is the 
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target of measurement. [For example,] some schools encourage underqualified applicants to apply 
to boost their selectivity statistics.” New methodologies may also be a kind of preemptive gaming. 
For example, Paul Caron (2011) has found that “in every alternative ranking of law schools, the 
ranker’s school ranks higher than it does under U.S. News [the dominant ranking method].” 
5. A simple metric of comparison might be the “thirty-day mortality rate” (i.e., the number of 
patients who die within thirty days of surgery). But that is manipulable—a patient might be kept 
on mechanical ventilation postsurgery for thirty-one days to count as a survivor in the reporting 
period. 
6. Works citing this paper put forward a surprising array of explanations for the paradox. 
7. To be clear: Fodor’s position is contested. I do not accept it as given but merely mention it here 
as a conceptualization of thought that is highly influential among devotees of strong AI and 
automation that substitutes machines for workers. 
8. The organic analogy goes back at least to Plato, as Anthony Kronman (1993) explains in his 
discussion of the city and the soul in The Lost Lawyer. 
9. Note also how lawyers failed, losing on First Amendment grounds, when they sued Avvo for 
rating them. Vrdolyak v. Avvo, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 3d 1384 (N.D. Ill. 2016). 
10. For example, such institutions may resist calls to cut college to three or two years, or to 
continually channel demand for medical care into cheap apps, when it is clear that the longer time 
period or personal touch both serve the student’s/patient’s best interests and those of society as a 
whole. There is no necessary tension between producer and consumer interests here, particularly 
when both can agree to develop public financing mechanisms that provide universal access to high 
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